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PRINCIPAL AND AGENT; PRINCIPAL'S LIABILITY FOR AGENT'S
DISHONESTY.
In the case of .nox v. Eden .M1usee Aynerican Co.,

45 N. Y. Supp. 255 (May 7, x89.7), it was decided that an employer
is not negligent in not knowing or suspecting the dishonesty of an
employe who has been in his service for several years and who has
discharged his duties honestly and faithfully until within a short time
before he left the service; and the employer is not liable to a third
person whom the employe was enabled to defraud by virtue of his
employment, though the dishonesty could easily hav6 been detected
by an inspection of the books of which the employe had exclusive
charge.
An investigation of the facts in this case will show that the decision
follows the general trend of the law. The agent acted clearly outside
his authority when he pledged the stock certificates, which had been
left in his charge for cancellation, for his own debt. His act was not
in any way connected with his employer's business: BriishBank
v. Clzarnwood Co., 18 Q. B. D. 714 (1878).
The principal is not bound to inform himself as to the manner in
which the agent conducts his business, and to see that his instructions are obeyed. His neglect to do so is not ground of liability,
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unless it induces those dealing with the agent to believe he had
authority: Wheeler v. 31cGuire, 86 Ala. 398 (1889).
The principal is not bound to supervise the conduct of the agent to see that
he does not exceed his authority: Schmidt v. Gaifield National
Bank, i9 N. Y. Supp. 252 (1892).
Whether or not the principal
has used diligence in supervising his agent's work is a question for
the court: Manhattan Co. v. Zydz9, 4 Johns. 376 (18o9).
Stock certificates fraudulently pledged by one who has them in his
possession as a trustee may be recovered by the owner: Shaw v.
Spencer, ioo Mass. 382 (1868).
The owner of a non-negotiable
note, past due, may recover it from one who has purchased it for
value from the agent of the owner, where the latter was intrusted
with it for a special purpose and fraudulently transferred it to the
purchaser: Weathered v. Smith, 9 Tex. 622 (1853).
Where a
bookkeeper in a bank fraudulently entered moneys in the depositbook of a dealer, which the latter had intrusted the bookkeeper to
deposit, though this was outside of the latter's business, and the
money not given in the bank or during banking hours, the bank was
allowed to recover from the dealer for the deficiency in his account
caused by the misappropriation by the bookkeeper, the bank having
used the ordinary means of detecting any error in the books: AfAinhatan Co. v. Lydig, (supra).
The stock certificates were not negotiable and so the principal
was not bound by the fraudulent act of the agent : Afechanics' Bank
v. N Y., Etc., R. R., 13 N. Y. 599 (1856).
The fraudulent
issue of stock by the secretary of a corporation to himself, and
afterwards pledged for his own debt, does not bind the corporation,
and this even though the fraud was made possible by the officers of
the corporation in signing blank certificates and leaving them with
the secretary to be used as transfers: .. , N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co.
v. Citizens' National Bank, 24 Wkly. Law Bull. 198 (Cincinnati
Super. Ct. 189I). Nor is a bank liable on notes left in a negligent
manner so that they were stolen and the president's name forged
thereon: Salem Bank v. Gloucester Bank, 17 Mass.. i (182o). In
general the misappropriation by an agent of his principal's fund for
his own purposes does not bar the principal's right to recover, nor
make him liable therefor: FirstNationalBank v. Oberne, 1 21 Ill.
25 (1889); Edwards v. Dooley, 12o N. Y. 540 (1890) ; F1irst
NationalBank v. Taliaferro, 19 At. 364 (Md. 189o); Gerard
v. McCormick, 13o N. Y. 261 (1892); M anhattan L. Ins. Co.
v. Fory-secondSt., Etc., Co., 19 N. Y. Supp. 90 (1892).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DUE PROCESS; PERSONAL PROPERTY;
DOGs. In Sentell v. N. 0. & C. R. R., 17 S. C. Rep. 693
(April 26, 1897), the plaintiff sought to recover for the death of
his dog, which was run over and killed by the defendant's electric
car. The dog had not been placed upon the assessment rolls, and
was, therefore, according to a certain statute of Louisiana, not
entitled to the protection of the law. The plaintiff claimed that
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the statute was unconstitutional as depriving him of his property
without due process of law. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that property in dogs is of a qualified nature,
and not perfected until the regulations prescribed by the State are
complied with; that it is within the discretion of the legislature
to say how far dogs are property, and that therefore the statute in
question was constitutional, and the plaintiff could not recover.
It has long been recognized that there is no complete property
in dogs as in beasts of burden, or as in those useful for food. At
common law a dog is not the subject of larceny, but the taking of
a dog is an invasion of property amounting to a civil injury, and
redressed by a civil action: 2 Black. Comm. 393; 4 Black. Comm.
236. The right of civil action shows there is some property in a
dog at common law which distinguishes him from animals fere,
natrz: Ireland v. Higg&ins, Cro. El. 126 (1592);
Wright v.
Ramscot, i Saund. 84 (1667).
Such an action has been allowed
in this country in the absence of any statute: Dodson v. Mock,
4 Dev. & Bat. (N. C.) 146 (1838) ; Parkerv. AMise, 27 Ala. 480
(i855) ; Wheatley v. Harris, 4 Sneed (Tenn.) 469 (1857);
Brent v. Kimball, 6o Ill. 211 (1871); Ten Hoen v. Walker,
96 Mich. 236 (1893). But a criminal prosecution for larceny of
a dog will not be allowed: Wardv. State, 48 Ala. 16i (1872);
State v. Holder, 81 N. C. 527 (1879) ; State v. Doe, 79 Ind. 9
(I881); nor for a malicious injury to a dog: State v. Marshall,
13 Tex. 55 (1854). It has been held, however, that where a
statute punishes the malicious injury -of personal property, this
includes injury to a dog: State v. kcDuffie, 34 N. H. 583 (1857) ;
State v. Kinsman, 77 Ind. 132 (i88i). So a statute declaring
that larcency includes the taking away of any personal property
makes dogs the subject of larceny: Harringtonv. Miles, ii Kan.
480 (1873) ; State v. Brown, 9 Bax. (Tenn.) 163 (1876) ; .Mllaly v. People, 86 N. Y. 365 (1881).
In some States, on the
other hand, it has been held that a dog is not included under
the term "goods and chattels," and that the old common law rule
as to larceny still exists: Findlay v. Bear, 8 S. & R. (Pa.) 571
(1823); State v. Lymus, 26 Ohio St. 400 (1875). In England
it has been held that a dog is not a "chattel" under a statute providing punishment for obtaining chattels under false pretences:
.Regina v. Robinson, 8 Cox C. C. I15 (859).
A statute punishing the killing of domestic animals has been held not to include a
dog: U. S. v. Gideon, I Minn. 292 (1856) ; State v. Harriman,
75 Me. 562 (1884).
Following out the common law idea that property in dogs is not
absolute, statutes ordering the killing of unmuzzled or unregistered
dogs have been held within the police power: Tower v. Tower,
18 Pick. 262 (1836) ; Haller v. Sheridan, 27 Ind. 494 (1867) ;
Blair v. Forehand, Ioo Mass. 136 (1868); Morewood v. Wakefield, 133 Mass. 240 (1882) ; Jenkins v. Ballntyne, 8 Utah, 245
(1892).
But such a statute does not authorize the conversion of
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an unmuzzled dog to one's own use: Cummings v. Perkam, i Met.
(Mass.) 555 (1840) ; nor does it justify the killing of such a dog
by another dog: Heisrodt v. Hackett, 34 Mich. 283 (1876).
But
in States where the common law has been changed by statute, and
dogs have all the attributes of property, and are the subject of
larceny, an order for the shooting of unmuzzled dogs is unconstitutional, as depriving a man of his property without due process of
law: Lynn v. State, 25 S. W. 779 (Tex.) (1894).
As property in dogs is therefore of such an imperfect character
and at common law protected only by civil action, in the absence
of a statute making such property absolute the legislature has the
right to prescibe the means by which that property right shall be
perfected, and brought under the full protection of the law, and as
it affords such means by registration when the owner thinks the
property worth it, it may refuse the protection of the law to such
property as, by omitting to register, he is deemed to consider
worthless. The legislature, in the exercise of the police power, has
provided, in the interests of the community, for the means of
distinction between valuable dogs and dogs not worth preservation,
and has placed the securing of the safety of his own property in the
power of every owner.
EVIDENCE; PROOF bF PATERNITY.

It has always been a difficult

matter for the courts to determine how far evidence of resemblance
between persons should be. admitted to prove relationship. In
Copeland v. State, 40 S. W. 589, Tex., (May 12, 1897), the
appellant was tried for larceny, and her defense being that the
money had been given her by the prosecutor for the support of her
grandchild, she offered the six weeks' old child in evidence to
prove that the prosecutor was the father. It was held that the
child was too immature in development to be inspected by the jury
in comparison with the prosecutor. As the same court had previously held, in Barnes v. State, 39 S. W. 684, Tex., (Mar. 24,
1897), that a child of three months old could not be offered for the
same purpose, the decision could not well have been otherwise.
The general rule is that evidence of resemblance, as testified to
by other persons, will not be received, as being only matter of
opinion: U. S. v. Collins, i Cranch Circ. 592 (1809) ; Keniston
v. Rowe, 16 Me. 38 (1839) ; Eddyv. Gray, 4 Allen, (Mass.) 435
(1862).
In some States it is further held that the child cannot be
brought before the jury for their inspection: Risk v. State, 19 Ind.
152 (1862) ; State v. Danforth, 48 Iowa, 43 (1878), disapproving
of Stumm v. Hummel, 39 Iowa, 478 (1874) ; People v. Carney, 29
Hun, (N. Y.) 47 (1885) ; Hanawaltv. State, 64Wis. 84 (1885);
Robnett v. People, 16 Ill. App. 299 (1885) ; Clark v. Bradstreet,
8o Me. 454 (1888) ; Overlock v. Hall, 81 Me. 348 (1889).
In
most States, however, such inspection is allowed: Gilmanton v.
Ham, 38 N. H. io8 (1859) ; .Finnegan v. Dugan, 14 Allen,
(Mass.) 197 (1867); Paulk v. State, 52 Ala. 427 (1875); State
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v. Btit, 78 N. C. 439 (1878); Gauntv. State, 5o N. J. L. 490
(1888); especially ifthere is a question of mixed blood: Warlock
v. White, 76 N. C. 75 (I877). In most of the cases in which the
inspection was refused, ihough the reasons were stated in general
terms, it will be found that the child was too young for any supposed
likeness to be a safe guide in the determination of its paternity. In
State v. Danforth (supra), the child was only three months old; in
Clark v. Bradstreet (supra), the child was six months old, and it
was held the evidence was too vague, uncertain, and fanciful; in
Overlock v. Hall (supra), the child was six months old; Hanawalt v. State (sup ra) decided that a child less than a year old
could not be admitted in evidence.
There seems to be no fixed age limit after which the child will be
admitted. In State v. Smith, 54 Iowa, 104 (1885), where the
child was two years old, the jury were allowed to inspect, as it was
considered that the circumstances differed from those of State v.
Danfortk (supra). The court said: "Though resemblance often
exists between persons who are not related, still what is called
family resemblance is sometimes so marked as scarcely to admit of
mistake. We are of the opinion, therefore, that a child of the
proper age may be exhibited to the jury as evidence of alleged
paternity. "
The test of what is the proper age seems to be whether the child
still retains the immaturity of features which render it unsafe for
comparison; if so, as is plain in the case under discussion, it cannot
be shown to the jury as evidence of paternity or other relationship.
MISTAKE;
LAW.
rhat

RIGHT TO'RECOVER MONEY PAID UNDER MISTAKE OF

the doctrine denying the right to recover money paid
under a mistake of law is no longer accepted in its entirety is
instanced in a recent Pennsylvania case, Comm. v. LancasterCounty,
6 District Reports (Pa.), 371 (June, 1897). The facts were that
the Receiver of the Insurance Company collected various assessments
from policy-holders, in somc cases with, in some without, suit. The
policies having been adjudged to be non-assessible, those who had
paid sued to recover the amount of the assessments, their recovery
being resisted on the ground that it was money paid under a mistake
of law. After a searching analysis of the authorities, the Court of
Common Pleas of Dauphin County, in a learned opinion, allowed a
recovery, adopting the principle laid down by Lord Mansfield, in
Bize v. Dickason, 1 T. R. 285 (1786), that if a man has actually
paid what the law would not have compelled him to pay, but
what in equity and conscience ought, he cannot recover it back ;
but if money be paid under a mistake which there was no ground to
claim in conscience, the party may recover it back. (This case
will be noticed more fully when it reaches, as it probably will,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.)
WILLS;

DEVISE

TO

ATTESTING

WITNESS:

Davis v. Davis,
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Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, 27 S. E. Rep. 323
(April, 1897). If a will can be proven independently of the testimony of an attesting witness beneficially interested therein, is a
devise to such witness or her husband void? This is a question
which the Supreme Court of West Virginia has lately answered .in
the negative. In the case in which this question arose, the validity
of the will or the probate thereof was in no wise attacked,-it was
simply claimed that because one of the devisees placed herself in
the attitude of an attesting witness, she must be deprived of her
interest. Section i8, c. 77, of the Code of West Virginia, has an
important bearing on the issue, and is as follows: "If a will be
attested by a person to whom or to whose wife or husband any
beneficial interest in any estate is thereby devised or bequeathed, if
the will may not be otherwise proven, such person shall be deemed
a competent witness, but such devise or bequest shall be void, etc."
The position of the appellants was that the attestation was valid,
but that it was so for the reason that the disability of the witness to
attest the will was taken away by destroying her interest therein, in
other words that the attestation rendered the will void, and not the
fact that the will could not otherwise be proved. The court said
that this construction was plainly contrary to the intent of the
statute, which clearly contemplated that no valid will should be
held void in any of its provisions if established by disinterested
testimony.
In the case of Blake v. Knight, 3 Curt. Ecc. 547 (1843), it was
said: "The court is not bound to have positive affirmative evidence
In Jesse v. Parker, 6 Grat. 57
of the subscribing witnesses."
(1849), Judge Allen said: " The law does not prescribe the mode
of proof nor that the will should be proved as well as attested by a
specific number of witnesses. If such proof were to be required
from each subscribing witness, the validity of wills would be made
to depend upon the memory and good faith of the witnesses and not
upon reasonable proof that all the requirements of the statute had
In the case of Webb v. D)ye, 18 W. Va.
been complied with."
376 (i88x), it was held, that a will must be subscribed but need
not be proven by two attesting witnesses. So the will under
consideration could have been, and was, fully established by the
other attesting witnesses. It might have occurred that the will
could not have been established without the testimony of this
particular devisee, and in such a case to make her competent, as
against the heirs of the testator, her beneficial interest would have
to be avoided. It was contended by counsel for the appellant that
the word competent related to the time of the attestation. If this
were so, then a will attested by such person would be void although
it might be otherwise proved. Following this argument to its
logical conclusion, the will, though invalid in its conception, could
be rendered valid by destroying all other means of proof except that
of the interested attesting witness. The conclusion of the court
was that an interested attesting witness merely ran the risk of losing
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all beneficial right under the will by reason of the statutory provision. Such risk she had the right to take, and was not subject to
forfeiture merely by reason thereof.
RIPARIAN RIGHTS;
PRESCRIPTION.
An interesting question
arose in the case of Smith et al. v. Youmans et al., (Supreme Court
of Wisconsin,) 14 N. W. Rep. 1115 (April 30, 1897), as to the
right of property owners whose lands have been overflowed by back
water from a dam, to have the water maintained at the artificial
level so produced.
Lake Beulah, the watercourse in question, had originally been a
shallow, marshy, lake, but the grantors of the defendants had, more
than forty years previous to the suit, closed the natural outlet of the
lake and construdted a dam and an artificial overflow at another
point, raising the level of the lake six feet above its natural height
and completely submerging the marshy edges. The lands surrounding the lake thereupon became very valuable as sites for
villas, country seats, and pleasure resorts.
The mill, for which the dam had been built, having been destroyed, the defendants removed the bulkheads for the purpose of
drawing down the water in the lake for use in the stream below.
The defendants asserted their right to decrease or increase the level
of the lake free from any restriction, although by their act the
marshy edges of the lake were exposed, rendering the neighborhood
unhealthy and destroying the value of the larlds as pleasure resorts.
The court held that the defendants had, by forty years user, obtained a prescriptive right to maintain the water of the lake at the
original height of the dam and to overflow the plaintiffs' lands, and
that the landowners had obtained a prescriptive right to have the
water maintained at that level so long as the defendants retained
their easement; that the rights of the parties were reciprocal and
could be enforced by the one against the other. It appears that
the defendants could escape their liability by abandoning their
easement. Much the same question had been decided by the same
court in the case of Cedar Lake ffotel Co. v. Cedar Creek Hydraulic
CO., 79 Wis. 297; 48 N. W. 371 (189i) ; but in that case the
natural level of a watercourse had been changed, while in the present
case the change had been made in the artificial level. The court
practically held that after forty years user the artificial pool became
the natural level, and the same rules of law applied.
CONTRACTS;
BENEFITS.
In

RESCISSION

IN

CASE

OF

FRAUD;

RETURN

OF

Stodder v. Sauthern Granite CO., 27 S. E. 174
(Ga.), Nov. 30, 1896 (first reported May io, 1897), the plaintiff
was injured by defendant's negligence. Afterwards, while still
weak in body and mind on account of his injury, he was induced
through fraud to sign a paper purporting to be in full settlement of
all claim for damages
For this paper plaintiff received twenty
dollars, which sum he alleged that he was utterly unable to repay.

